Criminal Procedure—Peremptory Challenges in Felony Prosecutions by Bryan, Pamela J.
University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review 
Volume 10 Issue 2 Article 8 
1987 
Criminal Procedure—Peremptory Challenges in Felony 
Prosecutions 
Pamela J. Bryan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Pamela J. Bryan, Criminal Procedure—Peremptory Challenges in Felony Prosecutions, 10 U. ARK. LITTLE 
ROCK L. REV. 415 (1988). 
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview/vol10/iss2/8 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review by an authorized editor of Bowen Law 
Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact mmserfass@ualr.edu. 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES IN FEL-
ONY PROSECUTIONS. Chenowith v. State, 291 Ark. 372, 724 S.W.2d
488 (1987).
The state charged Phillip Tod Chenowith, Boyce Shaddon,
Johnny Lee Tubbs, and Raymond Pierce, Jr., with the crime of theft
of property.' The state alleged that the defendants took control of
certain cattle belonging to John Childress with the intent to perma-
nently deprive Childress of his property. The case came to trial in
February of 1986. At the beginning of jury selection proceedings, de-
fendant Shaddon requested that the court allow voir dire examination
of each juror individually.2 The state objected to this procedure on
the grounds that it would cause undue delay in the proceedings.
The court ruled that the parties could voir dire panel members
two at a time. Defendant Shaddon specifically objected to this proce-
dure stating that it allowed the prosecution to choose the least desira-
ble of two panel members before exercising peremptory challenges.3
Defendant Chenowith joined in the objection. Subsequently, the state
exercised three peremptory challenges and the defendants, who
shared a combined total of eight challenges, exercised all eight of their
peremptory challenges.4 At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found
defendants Chenowith and Shaddon guilty.5 Chenowith and Shaddon
1. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2203 (1977).
2. Since the trial involved codefendants, the trial record is complex. Mr. Street, the
counsel who made the objection, was the attorney for defendant Shaddon. Brief for Appellant
Chenowith at 10, Chenowith v. State, 291 Ark. 372, 724 S.W.2d 488 (1987) (No. 86-156)
(quoting Record at 277).
3. Brief for Appellant Chenowith at 10, Chenowith v. State, 291 Ark. 372, 724 S.W.2d
488 (1987) (No. 86-156).
4. The number of peremptory challenges permitted in a criminal felony case is governed
by statute. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-1921 (Cum. Supp. 1985) provides the prosecution with 10
peremptory challenges in cases for capital murder, six peremptory challenges in all other fel-
ony cases, and three peremptory challenges in misdemeanor cases. Similarly, ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 43-1922 (Cum. Supp. 1985) provides the defendant(s) with twelve peremptory chal-
lenges in capital murder cases, eight peremptory challenges in all other felony cases and three
challenges for misdemeanors. Since the availability of peremptory challenges is limited, they
must be exercised wisely. Defendant Shaddon alleged that allowing the prosecution to voir
dire the panel members two at a time gave the prosecution an unfair advantage. Brief for
Appellant Chenowith at 10, Chenowith v. State, 291 Ark. 372, 724 S.W.2d 488 (1987). The
prosecution could choose between two panel members as opposed to making the challenge
decision one at a time. The procedure allowed the prosecution to reduce the risk that subse-
quent panel members would be less desirable than the one just challenged.
5. The jury found defendant Chenowith guilty of theft of property in violation of ARK.
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appealed, designating as error the procedure used to voir dire and
challenge the jurors.6
On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court found no prejudicial er-
ror in the procedure used by the lower court for selection of jurors
and upheld the convictions. The court overruled the 1975 decision of
Clark v. State7 and liberally construed Arkansas Statutes Annotated
section 43-1903.8 The court held that the specific manner of con-
ducting voir dire is within the discretion of the court so long as the
state is required to exercise its challenges before the defendant. Che-
nowith v. State, 291 Ark. 372, 724 S.W.2d 488 (1987).
The defendant's right to peremptory challenges in capital cases
existed in England during the early days of jury trials.9 At common
law, all felonies were punishable by death."° Since the defendant's life
STAT. ANN. § 41-2203 (1977). He was sentenced to four years imprisonment. Brief for Appel-
lant Chenowith at 1-2, Chenowith v. State, 291 Ark. 372, 724 S.W.2d 488 (1987). The jury
found defendant Shaddon guilty of the lesser included offense of theft by receiving and sen-
tenced him to one year with a six month suspension. Brief for Appellant Shaddon at 1, Che-
nowith v. State, 291 Ark. 372, 724 S.W.2d 488 (1987).
6. The appeal was initially taken to the Arkansas Court of Appeals. The court certified
the case to the Arkansas Supreme Court because it involved construction of a state statute.
See ARK. R. Sup. CT. 29(4)(a) (codified at ARK. STAT. ANN. app. tit. 27 (Supp. 1985)).
7. 258 Ark. 490, 527 S.W.2d 619 (1975).
8. The exercise of peremptory challenges in a criminal felony prosecution is addressed by
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-1903 (1977). The statute states:
In a prosecution for felony, the clerk, under the direction of the court, shall draw
from the jury box the names of twelve [12] petit jurors, who shall be sworn to make
true and perfect answers to such questions as may be asked them touching their
qualifications as jurors in the case on trial, and each juror may be examined by the
State and cross-examined by the defendant, touching his qualification. If the court
decide [sic] he is competent, the State may challenge him peremptorily or accept him,
then the defendant may peremptorily challenge or accept him. If not so challenged
by either party, he shall stand as a juror in the case, and each of the twelve [12] jurors
shall be examined and disposed of in like manner. If any of said jurors are disquali-
fied or challenged, the clerk shall draw from the box as many more as may be re-
quired, and as often as may be required, until the jury shall be obtained, or the whole
panel exhausted.
Id.
9. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *353. See also Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S.
370, 376 (1892). For a succinct discussion of the history of peremptory challenges see 2 A.
GINGER, JURY SELECTION IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL TRIALS 2D § 20.40, at 1132-33 (1984).
10. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at *98. See also 1 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW
§ 19 (C. Torcia 14th ed. 1978); R. PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAW § 1, at 10 (1969).
The term felony originated in the feudal law and primarily referred to a breach of feudal
engagement. M. RADIN, ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 234-38 (1936). By the time of
the Assize of Northampton in 1176, the term was used to apply to acts of violence and
breaches of the peace characterized as turpis felonia (shameful felony). Id. Punishment was
often by mutilation. Id. During the twelfth century, the rule was established that all felonies
were punishable by death. Id. See also G. CROSS & G. HALL, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM
75 (1964).
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was at risk, he had the right to be tried by a jury against whom the
defendant harboured no prejudice."I To achieve such a jury, the de-
fendant had the right to challenge jurors without showing cause. 12
These challenges became known as peremptory challenges.II
The English Crown enjoyed a right to peremptory challenges un-
til Parliament eliminated this right by statute in 1305.14 Despite this
fact, the English courts granted the Crown the courtesy of exercising
peremptory challenges.' 5 Further, the Crown did not have to exercise
peremptory challenges until after the defendant exercised all of his
challenges. 16
In the United States, an early statutory enactment secured the
defendant's right to peremptory challenges in capital cases. ' The
right has since been referred to as one of the defendant's most impor-
tant rights'8 and an essential part of the trial.'9  While the right is
given in an attempt to secure an impartial jury,2" it is viewed as the
right to reject jurors and not a right to select jurors.2' It was not until
1865 that Congress extended the same right to the prosecution for
11. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at *353. Blackstone notes that because common law
felonies were punishable by death, there existed an in favorem vitae (in favor of life) which
allowed the defendant to challenge jurors without a showing of cause. Id. The law designated
such challenges peremptory challenges. Id. As Blackstone describes it, the defendant "should
have a good opinion of his jury" when the defendant is defending his/her life. Id. See also
Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892); United States v. Marchant, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 480, 482 (1827); sources cited supra note 10.
12. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at *353.
13. Id.
14. An Ordinance for Inquests, 33 Edw., st. 4 (1305). The statute provided: "He that
challengeth a Jury or a Juror for the King shall shew the Cause." Id.
15. While the statute eliminated the Crown's right to peremptory challenges it did not
affect the challenges for cause. The actual practice was to allow the Crown to set jurors aside
without explanation until the entire panel had been exhausted. If a full panel could not be
obtained without some of the jurors the Crown set aside, the defendant could challenge the
Crown and force it to show cause for its challenges. The court then required the defendant, to
explain his challenges prior to the explanation by the Crown. The practice effectively provided
the Crown with peremptory challenges. United States v. Marchant, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 480,
483 (1827).
16. Id.
17. An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, ch. 9, § 30, 1
Stat. 112, 119 (1790). The statute, enacted by the Second Session of the First Congress, gave
the accused 35 peremptory challenges for charges of treason and 20 challenges for all other
capital crimes. See also United States v. Marchant, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 480 (1827); infra note
22.
18. Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894).
19. Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892).
20. Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497, 505 (1948).
21. United States v. Marchant, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 480, 482 (1827).
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criminal cases tried in federal court.2 2
In the late 1800s, the United States Supreme Court addressed the
procedures required for the exercise of peremptory challenges in fed-
eral courts. In Lewis v. United States23 the Court held that the de-
fendant had a right to be present when jurors were challenged, 24 but
placed the procedures for exercising peremptory challenges in the dis-
cretion of the court.2 1 Similarly, in Pointer v. United States,26 the
Court held that congressional enactment and settled principles of
criminal law governed the procedures for empaneling a jury.2 7 Since
neither source suggested a particular procedure for the exercise of
peremptory challenges, the Court ruled that the specific procedures
are within the discretion of the court.28 This rule remains unchanged
22. An Act regulating the Proceedings in criminal Cases, ch. 86, § 2, 13 Stat. 500 (1865).
The act gave the government five peremptory challenges and the defendant twenty in cases of
treason or capital offenses. It also limited the defendant to ten peremptory challenges and gave
the government two peremptory challenges for any other offense to which peremptory chal-
lenges were attached at the time of the act. Id.
23. 146 U.S. 370 (1892).
24. Id. at 376. In Lewis the trial court required the defendant and the prosecution to
challenge jurors by striking names from a list of prospective jurors. Each side exercised their
challenges independent of the other side and without any knowledge of the others' strikes until
the final jury had been selected. The defendant objected to this procedure because it resulted
in the defendant challenging some of the same jurors challenged by the prosecution. Id. at
371-72. The Supreme Court held that while it might be convenient or even beneficial for the
federal district court to adopt the procedures of the locus state, the court is under no obligation
to adopt any particular procedure. Id. at 376-77. Furthermore, the court is under no obliga-
tion to establish a court policy for the exercise of peremptory challenges. However, the de-
fendant does have a right to be present when the jurors are examined. Id. at 376. Therefore,
the Court in Lewis reversed and remanded the conviction because the lower court required the
exercise of "secret" challenges outside the presence of the defendant. Id. at 379-80.
25. Id. at 379.
26. 151 U.S. 396 (1894).
27. Id. at 408. At the time of the Pointer decision, there was no federal statute addressing
the procedures for the exercise of peremptory challenges. Id. at 409. While it was permissible
for the federal court to adopt the procedures of the locus state, it was under no requirement to
do so. Id. at 407. The trial court in Pointer qualified 37 jurors and then required the defendant
and the prosecution to exercise challenges by striking names from a list of 37 jurors. The
defendant objected to the procedure because it did not conform to the procedures required by
Arkansas law. Id. at 398-99. The Court noted that making peremptory challenges was an
essential part of the trial. Id. at 405. Further, state law controlled the qualifications and
exemptions of jurors. However, procedures for empanelling jurors and exercising peremptory
challenges were within the discretion of the court. Id. at 407-08. See also Lewis v. United
States, 146 U.S. 370, 379 (1892).
28. 151 U.S. at 410. In federal courts the jury selection procedure used today is very
similar to the procedure described by the Court in Pointer. Id. at 398-99. Generally, in federal
court 32 panel members are drawn. The panel members are questioned as a group by the judge
in order to determine basic qualifications. After the court qualifies the panel, voir dire begins.
If panel members are struck for cause, they are replaced with new panel members who are also
questioned by the judge to determine qualifications. After voir dire, each side is given a list of
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at the present time.
Both Lewis and Pointer originated in the Federal Court for the
Western District of Arkansas. In both cases, the defendants objected
to the court procedures for exercising peremptory challenges.30  As
the Court noted in Pointer, Arkansas law required that peremptory
challenges be exercised first by the prosecution and then by the
defendant. 3
In 1900 Lackey v. State3 2 provided the Arkansas Supreme Court
with an opportunity to interpret the jury selection statute.33 Lackey
held that the statute required the state to accept a juror before the
defendant was required to exercise peremptory challenges.34 In the
years following Lackey, the Arkansas Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether a deviation from procedures would constitute revers-
ible error.35
all the panel members. Independently and simultaneously, each side exercises its peremptory
challenges by striking names from the list. The clerk then tallies the results. The first 12
names on the list that "survive" being struck by either side constitute the final jury. See FED.
R. CRIM. P. 24(a), (b); 3 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
§ 15-2.6 commentary at 69-70 (1986).
29. E.g., United States v. Bryant, 671 F.2d 450 (1 1th Cir. 1982); United States v. Morris,
623 F.2d 145 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1065 (1980); United States v. Durham, 587
F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Mayes, 512 F.2d 637 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422
U.S. 1008 (1975); United States v. Mackey, 345 F.2d 499 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 824
(1965); Holmes v. United States, 134 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1943).
30. Pointer, 151 U.S. at 405. Accord Lewis, 146 U.S. at 372. See supra notes 24 & 27.
31. 151 U.S. at 409. At the time of the 1894 Pointer decision, jury selection procedures
for criminal felony prosecutions in Arkansas state courts were governed by statute. SAND. &
H. DIG. § 2193 (1894). Ten years earlier in 1884, the applicable statute stated: "The challenge
to the juror shall first be made by the state, and then by the defendant; and the state must
exhaust her challenges to each particular juror before such juror is passed to the defendant for
challenge or acceptance." MANS. DIG. § 2242 (1884). The statute as it existed in 1894 con-
tained the same wording as the present day statute. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-1903 (1977). See
supra note 8 and infra note 33. See also CRIM. CODE § 193; C. & M. DIG. § 3144 (1921);
POPE'S DIG. § 3979 (1937). As recently as 1959, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the
right of peremptory challenges was a creature of statute. Hogan v. Hill, 229 Ark. 758, 318
S.W.2d 580 (1958).
32. 67 Ark. 416, 55 S.W. 213 (1900).
33. SAND. & H. DIG. § 2193 (1900) (codified as amended at ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-1903
(1977)). From the time of the 1894 Pointer decision to the present day, the statute has under-
gone only slight changes in semantics. See supra notes 8 & 31.
34. 67 Ark. at 419, 55 S.W. at 214. The court interpreted the statute as requiring:
[T]he state must exhaust her challenges for cause before passing the juror to the
defendant for that purpose, and that, when the court has decided the juror to be
competent, the state must first be called upon to accept or challenge the juror, and
must accept before the defendant can be called on for that purpose.
Id. The court also stated that the court's determination of competency would depend on the
state's and defendant's examination of the jurors. Id. at 418, 419, 55 S.W. at 214.
35. See, e.g., Camp v. State, 249 Ark. 1075, 467 S.W.2d 707 (1971) (allowing the state and
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By 1975, the law in Arkansas could be summarized as follows:
(1) As long as the defendant was allowed to "face" the jurors before
exercising any challenges, the specific procedures to be followed were
to be governed by statute and subject to judicial discretion;36 (2) the
controlling statute for challenges in criminal felony prosecutions was
Arkansas Statutes Annotated section 43-1903;17 and (3) the state
must exercise peremptory challenges prior to the defendant exercising
peremptory challenges.38
In 1975, the issue of peremptory challenge procedures again
came to the attention of the Arkansas Supreme Court. In Clark v.
State 39 appellant Clark contended that the trial court violated the jury
selection statute4° because the court did not require the state to accept
or peremptorily challenge jurors one at a time.4 The court held that
section 43-1903 required the state to first accept or reject an individ-
ual juror before the defendant accepted or rejected the individual ju-
ror.42  Furthermore, the court ruled that prejudice would be
presumed from an error unless affirmatively shown otherwise.43 The
court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.
Seven years after Clark, the Arkansas Court of Appeals fully im-
plemented the Clark holding in Vowell v. State." The court held that
the defendant to voir dire jurors before exercising peremptory challenges is not error); Green v.
State, 223 Ark. 761, 270 S.W.2d 895 (1954) (nonprejudicial error injury selection is not revers-
ible error); Lee v. State, 73 Ark. 148, 83 S.W. 916 (1904) (conviction will be reversed for
prejudicial error only). In Stroud v. State, 169 Ark. 348, 275 S.W. 669 (1925) the defendant
requested that the court first qualify the jury panel before exercising challenges. The trial
court interpreted the request as meaning that the defendant wanted to exercise peremptory
challenges by striking names from a list. Id. at 350, 275 S.W. at 670. On appeal, the Arkansas
Supreme Court found the procedure violated ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-1903 (1921). 169 Ark. at
352, 275 S.W. at 670. The court stated that it would have reversed the conviction for that
reason alone but for the fact that the defendant requested the procedure and made no showing
that an undesired juror was permitted to serve on the jury. Id.
36. Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396 (1894). Accord Hogan v. Hill, 229 Ark. 758,
318 S.W.2d 580 (1958).
37. Crutchfield v. State, 251 Ark. 137, 471 S.W.2d 361 (1971).
38. Lackey v. State, 67 Ark. 416, 55 S.W. 213 (1900).
39. 258 Ark. 490, 527 S.W.2d 619 (1975).
40. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-1903 (1977).
41. Clark v. State, 258 Ark. 490, 493, 527 S.W.2d 619, 621 (1975). At Clark's trial, the
court drew a panel of 12 jurors. Each juror was examined first by the state and then by the
defendant. The trial court required the examination of all 12 jurors before allowing any per-
emptory challenges. Id. at 492, 527 S.W.2d at 620.
42. Id. at 493, 527 S.W.2d at 621.
43. Id. The court's ruling, that failure to follow procedures would give rise to a presump-
tion of prejudice, appeared to be in direct conflict with the court's earlier holdings in Green v.
State, 223 Ark. 761, 270 S.W.2d 895 (1954); Stroud v. State, 169 Ark. 348, 275 S.W. 669
(1925); and Lee v. State, 73 Ark. 148, 83 S.W. 916 (1904).
44. 4 Ark. App. 175, 628 S.W.2d 599, rev'd on other grounds, 276 Ark. 258, 634 S.W.2d
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"upon a timely request, voir dire of jurors in felony cases must be
conducted one at a time, followed by a peremptory challenge as to
that juror by the State, and then if that juror is accepted by the State,
a peremptory challenge by the defendant. 45 Chief Judge Mayfield
dissented in the case urging that section 43-1903 did not require ex-
amination of jurors one at a time.46
In Berna v. State,4 7 the Arkansas Supreme Court addressed the
question of whether procedural error constituted prejudicial error.48
Though disapproving of the procedures used,49 the court flatly stated
that prejudice would no longer be presumed from the commission of a
118 (1982). In Vowell the defendant made a timely request to voir dire and challenge jurors
one at a time. Id. at 181, 628 S.W.2d at 602. Although the defendant's request was granted,
the trial court did not impose the same requirement on the state. The trial court allowed the
state to choose the number of jurors to examine at one time and permitted the defendant to
examine jurors one at a time. The state chose to examine jurors three at a time. Id. at 177-78,
628 S.W.2d at 601. Basing its decision on Clark, the Arkansas Court of Appeals held that a
defendant could not be required to challenge jurors before the state exercises peremptory chal-
lenges. Id. at 181, 628 S.W.2d at 602. The court analogized the "unfair advantage" that the
state receives when the state is allowed to choose the number of jurors it wishes to voir dire at
one time to allowing only the state to voir dire jurors-a procedure which the court had previ-
ously condemned in Roleson v. State, 272 Ark. 346, 614 S.W.2d 656 (1981). See also Ford v.
State, 276 Ark. 98, 633 S.W.2d 3 (1982); Malone v. State, No. 76-187 (Ark. Jan. 24, 1977)
(WESTLAW) (holding that Clark required individual questioning); Franks v. Kyle, No. 81-73
(Ark. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 1981) (WESTLAW) (holding that Clark controlled and reversed a
conviction obtained after the trial court required the defendants to examine all the jurors
drawn from the jury panel before the state was required to accept or reject a juror).
45. 4 Ark. App. at 181, 628 S.W.2d at 602. After questioning an individual juror the state
had the opportunity to exercise a peremptory challenge. If the state accepted the juror, the
defendant then had the opportunity to challenge the juror. Id.
46. Id. at 196, 628 S.W.2d at 609 (Mayfield, C.J., dissenting).
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-1903 (Repl. 1977), certainly does not say that prospective jurors
must be examined in such a one-at-the-time manner . . . . Clark and Roleson ...
should not be extended ....
In both Clark and Roleson the state was allowed to exercise all its peremptory
challenges at one time against a group of prospective jurors which the state had
examined. This, the court held, gave the state the advantage of being able to exercise
its challenges against the group and excuse those considered least desirable instead of
having to reject them one at a time and perhaps use all its challenges before discover-
ing those least desirable. Now it is easy to see how this would be beneficial to the
state but it is difficult to understand why the defendant could not be given the same
opportunity to enjoy an equal benefit.
Id. Vowell was later reversed on other grounds. State v. Vowell, 276 Ark. 258, 634 S.W.2d
118 (1982).
47. 282 Ark. 563, 670 S.W.2d 434 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1085 (1985).
48. 282 Ark. at 567, 670 S.W.2d at 437.
49. Id. at 567, 670 S.W.2d at 437. Even though the questioned procedure had nothing to
do with the exercise of peremptory challenges, Berna is significant because it requires an af-
firmative showing of prejudice. The procedure allegedly violated in Berna consisted of sum-
moning jurors by ordinary mail instead of certified mail as required by ARK. STAT. ANN. § 39-
210 (Supp. 1985). Id. at 565, 670 S.W.2d at 436.
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procedural error.5" The court's decision in Berna appeared to conflict
with the "presumed prejudice" holding in Clark.5 The Arkansas
Court of Appeals applied Berna in holding that a trial court would
not be reversed on discretionary matters without a clear showing of
abuse of discretion that resulted in prejudice.52
Chenowith v. State3 presented the Arkansas Supreme Court with
the opportunity to squarely address the discrepancy between the "pre-
sumed prejudice" holding of Clark, and Berna's required showing of
prejudice. Justice Newbern delivered the opinion of the court and
summarized the Chenowith issue. The court considered whether Ar-
kansas Statutes Annotated section 43-190314 or general principles of
fairness required that, in felony cases, jurors should be subjected to
voir dire and challenges one at a time.55 In rejecting the requirement,
the court based its conclusion on three factors: an analysis of the
statute; a review of prior cases; and a comparison of Arkansas proce-
dures with recommended American Bar Association standards for
jury selection procedures.
Analyzing the statute which outlines the procedures for jury se-
lection in Arkansas criminal felony prosecutions,56 the court noted
that the statute specifically uses the terms "each" and "may." The
court summarily concluded that the language of the statute did not
prohibit the examination of all twelve, in a single group or in groups
of any number prior to the exrcese of lnIt held that sec-
tion 43-1903 only requires the state to exercise its peremptory chal-
lenges before the defendant exercises his challenges.58 The court also
concluded that the trial judge possesses discretion in the manner of
conducting voir dire.5 1 In other words, it is the order in which chal-
lenges are exercised and not the number of jurors upon which the
challenges are exercised, that will determine whether a violation of
50. Id. at 565, 670 S.W.2d at 436. See id. at 565-66, 670 S.W.2d at 436 (quoting McDon-
ough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 553 (1984) (harmless error rules are
founded on the principle that courts should reverse only for errors that affect the essential
fairness of the trial)).
51. Clark v. State, 258 Ark. 490, 527 S.W.2d 619 (1975).
52. Robinson v. State, No. 85-214 (Ark. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 1986) (WESTLAW). In
Robinson the issue concerned whether a peremptory challenge could be made after the jury is
selected but before it is sworn.
53. 291 Ark. 372, 724 S.W.2d 488 (1987).
54. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-1903 (1977).
55. 291 Ark. at 373, 724 S.W.2d at 489.
56. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-1903 (1977). See supra note 8.
57. 291 Ark. at 374, 724 S.W.2d at 489.
58. Id. at 378, 724 S.W.2d at 491-92.
59. Id.
[Vol. 10:415
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the statute exists.6 °
Reviewing the prior cases, the Arkansas Supreme Court con-
cluded that the cases did not support the construction it accorded
section 43-1903 in Chenowith.6" Prior cases required that upon a
timely request, the trial court was bound to grant a request for indi-
vidual voir dire.62 Furthermore, the Clark decision specifically re-
quired individual acceptance of a juror by the state before the
defendant was required to exercise a challenge.63
Finally, the court considered the absence of any uniform stan-
dard or procedure for the exercise of peremptory challenges in either
state64 or federal courts. 65  The court reviewed the holding of the
60. Id. at 375, 724 S.W.2d at 490.
61. Id. at 374, 724 S.W.2d at 489 (citing Clark v. State, 258 Ark. 490, 527 S.W.2d 619
(1975)); id. at 376, 724 S.W.2d at 490 (citing Vowell v. State, 4 Ark. App. 175, 628 S.W.2d
599, rev'd on other grounds, 276 Ark. 258, 634 S.W.2d 118 (1982); Roleson v. State, 272 Ark.
346, 614 S.W.2d 656 (1981)). See also Malone v. State, No. 76-187 (Ark. Jan. 24, 1977)
(WESTLAW); Franks v. Kyle, No. 81-73 (Ark. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 1981) (WESTLAW).
62. 291 Ark. at 374, 724 S.W.2d at 489 (referring to Vowell v. State, 4 Ark. App. 175, 628
S.W.2d 599, rev'd on other grounds, 276 Ark. 258, 634 S.W.2d 118 (1982)).
63. Id. at 375, 724 S.W.2d at 490. The court stated that Clark stood for the proposition
that failure to comply with this specific procedure is advantageous to the state and, therefore,
prejudicial to the defendant. Id. (quoting Clark v. State, 258 Ark. at 493-94, 527 S.W.2d at
621). However, Clark had not shown how the defendant had been prejudiced. Id. at 375, 724
S.W.2d at 490. The court further stated that Clark had been correctly applied in Vowell v.
State, 4 Ark. App. 175, 628 S.W.2d 599 (1982). The court minimized a subsequent reversal of
Vowell as based on a failure of the record and not on any conclusion as to the state of the law.
Chenowith, 291 Ark. at 376, 724 S.W.2d at 490.
64. In the states surrounding Arkansas there is no uniformity in the statutory provisions
governing the exercise of peremptory challenges in criminal felony prosecutions.
Louisiana makes the right to voir dire and peremptory challenges part of the state's consti-
tution, LA. CONST., art. 1, § 17; and requires the state to accept or challenge a panel member
before passing the question to the defendant. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 788 (West
Cum. Supp. 1987) (individual panel member is immediately sworn as a juror when accepted by
both sides).
Oklahoma requires the exercise of peremptory challenges prior to challenges for cause.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 655 (West Supp. 1987) (no distinction in the number of chal-
lenges allowed each side; in first degree murder cases, each side is allowed nine challenges; five
challenges are allowed in cases involving other felonies; and three challenges are allowed in all
other criminal cases).
Mississippi requires the state to exercise all of its challenges prior to the defendant exercis-
ing challenges. Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-17-3 (1972) (requires that the full panel be presented to
the defendant before the defendant exercises any challenges; each side allowed twelve chal-
lenges in capital offenses and six challenges in noncapital cases).
In Missouri, defendants are entitled to voir dire the entire panel before exercising any
challenges. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 546.210, 546.180 (Vernon 1987) (entitled to view the entire
panel; panel consists of twelve plus the total number of peremptory challenges that are avail-
able; challenges are conducted by striking from a list passed first to the state and then to the
defense; no distinction between the number of challenges provided the defense and the prose-
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United States Supreme Court in Pointer v. United States66 which con-
tained a discussion of the general principles controlling the peremp-
tory challenge process as well as the procedures required by the
Arkansas statute.67 The court also reviewed the American Bar Asso-
ciation Standards for Criminal Justice68 and the comments following
the standards.6 9 The comments recognize two primary methods of
exercising peremptory challenges. 70  The first is to challenge jurors
one at a time. The second method is generally used in federal court
and entails exercising challenges upon a group of jurors by striking
names from a list.71 The comments tend to praise the striking method
as being the superior method.72 Upon considering the principles of
Pointer and the differences between the Arkansas statutory proce-
cution; entitled to nine if the crime is punishable by death, six if the sentence is imprisonment
and two in all other criminal cases).
Tennessee provides for the simultaneous submission of written challenges, one juror at a
time. TENN. R. CRIM. PRO. 24(c), (d) (after twelve jurors have been passed for cause, both
sides are required to submit peremptory challenges to jurors in writing, one at a time; in prose-
cutions for murder, the state is allowed eight challenges per defendant and the defendants have
fifteen challenges each; in all other felonies, each defendant is allowed eight challenges and the
prosecution four for each defendant; each side is allowed three challenges for misdemeanors).
Texas requires individual and separate examination of each panel member in capital cases.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.17, .25, .26 (Vernon 1966) (in all other felony cases voir
dire may be conducted in the presence of the entire panel; challenges are accomplished by
striking names from a list; the first twelve names that survive the striking process compose the
jury; the number of peremptory challenges that each side is allowed varies according to type of
case and type of penalty sought).
65. 291 Ark. at 376-77, 724 S.W.2d at 490-91.
66. 151 U.S. 396 (1894).
67. 291 Ark. at 376-77, 724 S.W.2d at 490-91 (quoting Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S.
396 (1894)). The Pointer Court had concluded that it was not essential that Arkansas proce-
dures be adopted by the federal district court. 151 U.S. at 409.
68. 291 Ark. at 377, 724 S.W.2d at 491 (quoting 3 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STAN-
DARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 15-2.6 (1986)). The standards state:
(a) Peremptory challenges should be limited to a number no larger than ordinarily
necessary to provide reasonable assurance of obtaining an unbiased jury, but the trial
judge should be authorized to allow additional peremptory challenges when special
circumstances justify doing so.
(b) The procedure for exercise of peremptory challenges should permit challenge to
any of the persons who have been passed for cause.
(c) The number of peremptory challenges and the procedure for their exercise
should be governed by rule or statute.
3 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 15-2.6 (1986).
69. 291 Ark. at 377-78, 724 S.W.2d at 491.
70. Id. at 377, 724 S.W.2d at 491.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 377-78, 724 S.W.2d at 491 (the comments discuss Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
202 (1965), and conclude that the federal court procedures for peremptory challenges in felony
prosecutions is a "fairer system to the defendant" and an efficient way to obtain an impartial
jury).
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
dures and those discussed in the Standards, the court concluded that
the Clark rule of presumed prejudice was incorrect 73 and overruled
Clark.74
Chenowith construes section 43-1903 to require the state to ex-
amine jurors before the defendant examines jurors. Similarly, the
state must exercise its challenges before the defendant exercises chal-
lenges. Procedures beyond this broad guideline, however, are within
the discretion of the court. By overruling Clark, Chenowith further
establishes that prejudice is no longer to be presumed from a proce-
dural error but must be affirmatively proven.
Pamela J. Bryan
73. Id. at 378, 724 S.W.2d at 491.
74. Id.
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